Foundations & Fault Lines: The Legal Framework Relating to Freedom of Speech & Freedom of Religion or Belief in Sri Lanka

Freedom of Expression (FoE) and Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) are sometimes viewed  as competing rights: we are frequently told that to protect the sanctity of faith, we must muzzle the  speaker—and to protect the speaker, we must disregard the believer. However, the National  Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka’s (NCEASL) recently launched report titled, “Navigating Intersecting Rights: Freedom of Religion or Belief and Freedom of Expression in  Sri Lanka”, suggests this is a false dichotomy – and that far from being in conflict, FORB and  FoE are “mutually reinforcing” and “inextricably linked”. The report shows that there is an  inherent connection between a person’s internal thoughts and the way they express them to the  world. When we protect the right to speak, we protect the right to manifest faith; when we censor  speech, we inevitably undermine the freedom of belief itself. Drawing on legal analysis, expert  interviews and case studies, the report documents the lived experiences of Sri Lankans navigating  this intersection. The article summarises its findings on the legal framework.  

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and  Political Rights (ICCPR) establish FoRB and FoE as interdependent and mutually reinforcing.  International human rights standards emphasise that human rights protect people rather than belief  systems; therefore, the ability to express or critique religious ideas is essential to the full exercise  of religious freedom itself. While Sri Lanka has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and  Political Rights (ICCPR), significant gaps remain between international standards and domestic  legislation – with the intersection of these freedoms often characterized by tension, institutional  bias, and the restrictive application of law. A key obstacle is the failure to translate international  treaty obligations into domestic law. As a “dualist” state, Sri Lanka requires specific legislative  enactment to render its international obligations domestically enforceable. The failure to achieve  this coherent translation of international obligations has resulted in a legal vacuum where  constitutional and legal provisions frequently fall short of international standards. Article 10 of the  Constitution protects the internal freedom of thought – which is absolute and cannot be subject to any limitations – while the manifestation of religion protected under Article 14(1)(e) is subject to  restrictions – although in Sri Lanka, these limitations are broader than those recognised by the  ICCPR. Specifically, the Sri Lankan framework permits restrictions based on “general welfare,”  exceeding permitted limitations based on necessity and proportionality as allowed under the  ICCPR. 

Sri Lanka has several legislative enactments that, while ostensibly meant to maintain harmony,  have been persistently utilised to stifle dissent: 

● The ICCPR Act No. 56 of 2007: Intended to criminalise the advocacy of religious hatred that  constitutes incitement to violence (Article 20 of the ICCPR), Section 3 of the Act has instead  been used as a tool for repression and transformed into a pseudo-blasphemy law - frequently  invoked to punish those perceived as wounding majoritarian religious sentiments rather than  protecting vulnerable groups from actual incitement. Speaking at the online launch of the  report, Dr. Gehan Gunatilleke explained that Section 3 of the Act is inherently vague and  poorly drafted, as it largely reproduces the text of Article 20 of the ICCPR without being  carefully formulated as a criminal offence - failing to clearly define the elements of the crime  or establish the evidentiary threshold required for prosecution, resulting in rendering the 

provision difficult to enforce. The ICCPR Act also omits the international 3-part test (legality, necessity, and proportionality) and the high threshold for determining if an  expression constitutes incitement, as set out in the UN Rabat Plan of Action. (e.g. the arrests  of comedian Nathasha Edirisooriya and Pastor Jerome Fernando - in both cases, the state  invoked Section 3 of the ICCPR Act not to prevent actual incitement to violence, but to appease  the majority in a context where Article 9 gives Buddhism a special status). 

● The Penal Code (Sections 291A/291B): These provisions criminalize the ‘deliberate and  malicious’ wounding of religious feelings through words and actions. In practice, however,  they have been applied to shield majoritarian religious sentiments from legitimate critique,  with blasphemy-type restrictions effectively criminalizing dissent that does not reach the  internationally recognised threshold of incitement. (e.g. arrest of Nathasha Edirisooriya) 

● Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA): The PTA contains overbroad language and continues  to be used as a blunt instrument for “over-securitized” governance. Section 2(1)(h) allows for  the detention of individuals for speech that causes “religious disharmony,” or “ill-will” without  requiring a link to actual violence. This ambiguity allows the state to target dissenters, as seen  in the detention of individuals for peaceful religious convictions (e.g. Mohammed Rusdi).  

● The Online Safety Act (OSA) 2024: This Act introduces vague provisions, with Sections 15  and 16 penalising ‘false statements’ that outrage religious feelings, containing penalties  significantly harsher than the Penal Code for similar offences. Because theological claims are  by nature non-empirical and lie beyond logical testing, the power to define a theological  statement as ‘false’ grants the state-appointed Online Safety Commission an arbitrary and  subjective authority to regulate faith-based discourse and threatens self-censorship and  ultimately creates a chilling effect on dissenters and legitimate criticism. The Act also lacks a  clear appeal process for removed content and expands state access to user data, creating a  profound risk to anonymity and theological discourse. Thus, the OSA essentially empowers  the state to mandate a ‘truth’ for religious dogma, creating a significant threat to FoRB.  

A further concern raised at the report’s launch by Nathasha Edirisooriya, who has direct personal  experience of these provisions, is that the density of technical and legal language renders these  laws largely inaccessible to ordinary citizens – limiting not only public understanding, but the very  possibility of public scrutiny. 

The report also draws attention to the culture of impunity that persists due to entrenched institutional biases. The report’s findings indicate a consistent pattern: law enforcement prioritises  majoritarian interests at the direct expense of dissenters and religious minorities. For instance,  during communal violence in Aluthgama, Gintota, and Digana, police failed to take effective  action against perpetrators from the majority community. This selective application is not  incidental: the report argues it amounts to the state functioning as a primary perpetrator of FoRB  violations, actively facilitating restrictions on minority expression rather than simply failing to  prevent them. The asymmetry is stark – harmful speech targeting minority communities frequently  goes uninvestigated, while comparatively minor criticism of the majority religion draws immediate  state intervention. These structural legal failures provide the necessary environment for the specific  social tensions that are discussed in the report. 

This article is the first of a 3 part series based on the report. The next article will explore the practical tensions that  emerge from the enforcement of these laws while the final article will explore recommendations for reform.