When Words Offend: The Cost of Speaking Out on Religion in Sri Lanka

This article explores how human rights theory meets practical social friction, through a discussion of the  intersection of the Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) and Freedom of Expression (FoE) as analysed in  the report, “Navigating Intersecting Rights: Freedom of Religion or Belief and Freedom of Expression in  Sri Lanka”, recently launched by the National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL). When  the state prioritises the “purity” of a religion over the liberty of a person, the interdependence of these  rights is severed, leading to a climate where protecting belief is used as a pretext for protecting political  power. The report highlights several areas where such tensions emerge.  

Two key areas are arrests based on hate speech allegations, and the imposition of blasphemy-type  restrictions. Blasphemy laws are inherently contrary to human rights doctrine, as they seek to protect  ideas, not people. While Sri Lanka does not have specific blasphemy laws, several legal provisions are used  to shield religious beliefs and symbols from critique. In this regard, the report explores the landmark case  on the arrest of comedian Nathasha Edirisooriya in May 2023.

Edirisooriya was arrested following a  decontextualized 90-second clip circulated online. Nationalist activists led a calculated campaign,  misidentifying Edirisooriya (who is Buddhist) as a Christian to fuel the narrative of an external “attack” on  Buddhism. While her live audience reacted with laughter and enjoyment; and there was no hostility or  violence toward the Buddhist community during the event, she was charged under Sections 291A or 291B  of the Penal Code and section 3 of the ICCPR Act, for defaming Buddhism, for her satirization of  competitive parenting—comparing modern children to the young Siddhartha. The High Court of Colombo  eventually found her remarks were made with “humorous intent” rather than the “deliberate and  malicious intent” required for criminal liability. Edirisooriya’s arrest highlights the state's failure to apply  the Rabat Plan of Action’s six-part test, which requires a thorough assessment of whether the comment  poses a real risk of causing harm, including an evaluation of the speaker's status and the context in which  the statement was made, before invoking criminal law. It also reflects a worrying pattern where laws  meant to protect people from incitement to hatred are used to protect religious beliefs from criticism or  satire. For victims like Edirisooriya, the result is self-censorship—a loss of the natural response to humour and a withdrawal from the pluralistic dialogue necessary for democracy. 

While minority figures or dissidents are arrested for “offending” the majority, controversial figures from  the majority community have historically enjoyed impunity despite instigating riots. For example, the  conviction of Ven. Gnanasara Thero under sections 291B of the Penal Code, as upheld by the Colombo  High Court in June this year, for anti-Muslim remarks was a rare instance of accountability, yet he was  notably not charged under the more severe ICCPR Act for his role in previous communal riots. 

The report also explores the case of Pastor Jerome Fernando, who was arrested in late 2023 for a sermon  comparing Christianity to other faiths, which was perceived as derogatory towards Buddhism. While his  remarks were widely characterized as irresponsible, they did not meet the high threshold of inciting  imminent violence. His case also demonstrates the dangers of the digital age, where speech intended for  a private congregation can be moved to a volatile public square. 

Conversely, the arrest of astrologer Indika Thotawaththa in October 2023 for his statements on social  media critical of Islam illustrates the challenge of identifying “coded language” used to indirectly target a community, although disguised as doctrinal criticism. While Thotawaththa’s lawyers argued that his  remarks were part of a doctrinal debate, the report discusses that the petitioner, the All Ceylon  Jamiyyathul Ulama (ACJU), highlighted that such speech had caused real harm and called for meaningful 

accountability and tangible justice. This case demonstrates the difficulty of drawing a line between  attacking a faith and using faith as a vehicle to attack a community. 

The report also looks at propagation, proselytisation and issues surrounding conversion that emerge in  the intersection of FoRB and FoE, which remains a key trigger for majoritarian anxieties. While  the Christian Sahanaye Doratuwa Prayer Centre case established that Article 10 of our Constitution does  not provide a fundamental right to propagate, the landmark judgment in M. A. S. Kalyani de Silva et al.  v. S. J. B. Suwaris et al. reaffirmed that propagation itself is not a criminal offence, providing a critical legal  shield for minority faiths. More recently an HRCSL decision noted that in certain limited circumstances, an  act of propagation may be considered a protected manifestation or observance if it is perceived as  following a “command” of a particular faith. In these specific instances, the act could be treated as falling  within the scope of observance and thus be protected, as long as the act is not “bizarre” or “clearly non religious in motivation”. The report further discusses how regional majoritarian dynamics also persist in  this regard. In April 2025, at the Kalaimagal Sports Ground in Shanthipuram, Jaffna, police disrupted a  Christian gathering over ‘forced conversion’ allegations prompted by the Siva Senai. This illustrates how  local authorities often succumb to majoritarian pressure despite the lack of legal basis.  

The report also highlights the use of non-legal instruments to restrict religious manifestation through the  use of circulars which have the effect of stifling minority worship. Circulars requiring permission to build  or register places of worship are often treated as law at the local level to stop house-based worship,  despite lacking statutory authority. NCEASL has utilised the Right to Information Act to ascertain the scope  of this circular, and the Department of Christian Religious Affairs has confirmed that registration  is not mandatory, yet local authorities continue to demand registration as a prerequisite for worship and  gathering together. This has created a pervasive culture of religious policing that targets smaller, less  established groups. However, the report also notes that a few recent cases documented by the NCEASL  suggest an increasing awareness among law enforcement in certain parts of the country of the legal  framework governing registration of religious places of worship and a greater willingness to act in  accordance with the law, which is a welcome development. 

This article is the second of a 3 part series based on the report, and the next article will explore recommendations for  reform based on the issues discussed in the first and second articles.